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SECURITY INFORMATION

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Auth CS, USAF  
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(The following is offered as a basis for preparation of an estimate of atomic weapon allocation in the event of an attack on the United States. It is not intended to be a final statement. If it is determined that such an allocation statement is desirable, the position which it would occupy in the estimate can best be determined during the discussion period.)

## ONI, USAF DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

### ESTIMATE OF THE MOST PROBABLE SOVIET ALLOCATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

It is considered that the most probable allocation of the Soviet stockpile of atomic weapons in the event of an attack on the United States at any time during the period under consideration would develop generally through the following priority stages:

Priority 1: A quantity of weapons considered sufficient to prevent unacceptable launchings of atomic weapons against the Soviet Union would be allocated to appropriate targets both within and outside the continental United States, probably coincident with the initiation of hostilities in order to capitalize on the combined advantages of initiative and surprise. The number of weapons allotted to this task would be determined in part by the Soviet assessment of the atomic delivery capabilities of the US, the ability of the Communist defenses to reduce bomb delivery and their assessment of their capacity to absorb the remainder.

Priority 2: From any weapons remaining, the Soviets would allocate such numbers of bombs as they considered necessary to attain the following:

a. Neutralize or destroy the ability of the United States to sustain large-scale military operations in Eurasia.

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b. Neutralize or destroy the ability of the United States <sup>SR</sup> to develop or produce weapons potentially decisive or stalemating.

c. Neutralize or destroy the political, social and economic strengths of the United States to the extent that governmental decisions or changes satisfying to the Soviet leadership either would occur or could be brought about through additional pressures available to the Communists. (It can be expected that this phase of the attack will include assaults against population targets intended to create a maximum number of casualties.)

Priority 3: If any weapons remain they might be assigned to accomplish the following tasks listed in order of probable selection.

- a. Psychological-intimidation of campaigns against Europe and/or Japan.
- b. Capitulation of the United Kingdom.
- c. Support of Soviet land campaigns.

Priority 4: If any weapons remain, a general reserve might be held. It is probable that Priority 1 and 2 allocations would provide for a reserve for reattack or psychological purposes in those cases where it was considered desirable. It is probable also that Priority 1 and 2 allocations would require the expenditure of the major portion of the weapon stockpile. Accordingly, it is considered unlikely that any sizeable number of weapons would be allocated to targets other than those outlined in Priorities 1 and 2 above.

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ONI AMENDMENTS TO SE-36

Page 1 - Delete present assumptions and substitute: For the purpose of this estimate it is assumed that:

1. A Soviet attack on the US would be designed to cause the maximum possible reduction in the capability of the US to wage offensive war.

2. The USSR would not avoid employing any weapon or tactic because of US capabilities for retaliation in kind.

Page 4, para 3 - Delete last three sentences of paragraph.

Page 4, para 5 - Place period after "agents" and delete remainder of sentence.

Page 7, para 10 - Delete last sentence.

Page 10, para 15 - Delete third sentence.

Page 11, para 18 - Delete last sentence.

Page 13, para 22 - Add to the present paragraph:

Launching an improved V-1 with a range of 200 miles, though with limited accuracy, is considered currently feasible and within Soviet capability. However to date, no launching equipment, stowage facilities or missiles have actually been sighted on USSR submarines and while a few intelligence reports are available indicating Soviet activity in launching guided missiles the reports are of low or undetermined reliability and have not been definitely confirmed.

Page 13, para 23 - Delete fourth sentence.

Page 18, Section V - Delete.

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